今日看料

Kaliningrad Oblast and Challenges to the Baltic Sea Region

This is part of our special feature, Diversity, Security, Mobility: Challenges for Eastern Europe.

 

The case of Kaliningrad Oblast 鈥 the westernmost region of the Russian Federation physically detached from the mainland 鈥 should be seen as one of the most disappointing examples of post-Soviet transformation. Wielding close-to-perfect geopolitics and rich historical background, the oblast has failed to meet expectations of many domestic and foreign intellectuals, who had imagined Kaliningrad鈥檚 future to be prosperous and peaceful. On the other hand, the European Union (今日看料) acting via TACIS, 鈥淓uro region鈥 initiative, Northern Dimension, attempted to help the region in overcoming the burden of its uneasy past (associated with almost complete isolation) and challenging present, stipulated by an arduous process of post-Soviet transformation. As a result, aside from sizable economic support, the oblast was given a unique opportunity to establish 鈥渧ery-close-to-special鈥 type of relationships with the West 鈥 a prospect that was hardly conceivable in terms of the rest of Russia. Had this materialized (even in part) it would have drastically altered the essence of relations between Moscow and Brussels brining their communication to a qualitatively new level.

Regretfully, those were merely unfulfilled dreams. From 1996 on,[1] growing domestic conservatism coupled with aggressive populism signified re-orientation of Russian political discourse away from Liberal Institutionalism of the early 1990s toward neo-Eurasianist ideology. Neo-imperial nationalism that started to dominate Russian foreign policy thinking from the late 1990s,[2] continuing fear of separatism and growing paranoia over NATO鈥檚 eastward enlargement had profound and far-reaching consequences for the future of Kaliningrad.

 

Kaliningrad at the crossroad of history: why the 鈥済olden cage鈥 nostalgia prevailed?聽 聽

Throughout the Soviet period (with the exception of the first 10-15 years), history of Kaliningrad Oblast was shaped by some sort of 鈥渄uality.鈥 On the one hand, an unprecedented extent of its militarization and artificial isolation imposed by the Soviet regime turned the oblast into some sort of a 鈥済arrison state.鈥[3] At the same time, life in the oblast was not the same as in the rest of the USSR. Availability of western goods, the lack of notorious 鈥渄eficit鈥 and huge economic subsidies from the centre as a 鈥渃ompensation鈥 for challenging history, made lives of an average local dweller different from one had to have in the mainland. This created an illusion of stability and security, shielding the locals form ugliness of the Soviet routine. In a sense, this made the oblast a 鈥減rivileged鈥 part of the vast USSR, simultaneously making it one of the most desirable targets for internal migration.

The relative comfort and stability were destroyed in the early 1990s, when the oblast had to face the real world. The dissolution of the USSR cut it off the mainland by borders of newly emerged countries, destroying existing economic model and making communication with the rest of the Russian Federation more difficult. Consequently, the immediate shock of these transformations resulted in an economic shock that surpassed the one experienced by the rest of Russia. Despite the severity of the crisis, Moscow was unable/unwilling to work on a concrete strategy of economic reforms that would have alleviated consequences of this crisis. Meanwhile, being reluctant about the so-called 鈥淜aliningrad question,鈥 the Kremlin felt ill at ease with European countries taking a more active role in the fate of the oblast, being suspicious of either local separatism or external irredentism. From their part, the Europeans also had no interest in meddling in Kaliningrad internal affairs in order not to provoke Russia.

In the end, the lack of agreement and cohesive actions backfired on Kaliningrad. Within just several years, the oblast received such nicknames as 鈥淩ussia鈥檚 HIV capital鈥 and the 鈥渂lack hole of Europe鈥[4] 鈥 status that irritated the locals, embarrassed the Kremlin and disturbed the Europeans. The economic collapse in 1998 became the last drop 鈥 the local elites openly appealed to Moscow in search for solution of mounting (and seemingly irreconcilable) problems. With this, popular support for liberal reforms initiated in the early 1990s was melting down, along with the image of the West, with voices preaching for a 鈥渟trong hand鈥 becoming more audible. That is why the advent of young, energetic, and decisive Vladimir Putin with his promise of stability and order, was gladly embraced by the locals tired of hardships and envious of rapidly developing neighbours.[5] As it turned out, soon the price of 鈥渟tability 2.0鈥 had its dark flipside.

 

The 鈥渂eacon鈥 of the 鈥淩ussian World鈥: Kaliningrad as a source of 鈥渟oft鈥 challenges.

 

The fateful transformation of Kaliningrad from a 鈥減eriphery鈥 to the 鈥渧anguard鈥 of anti-Western sentiments was by no means something that happened over night. Rather, it should be seen as a complex and multi-layered phenomenon owed by its emergency to a constellation of internal and external factors. True, scepticism about the West and its role for Kaliningrad was present throughout the 1990s, yet those voices mostly emanated from marginalized groups being mute in comparison with general sentiments. However, with the lapse of time, anti-Western sentiments were no longer seen as something extraordinary. That gradual change of perception was precipitated by tectonic shifts that occurred within the interim from 1999 to 2004. The war in Yugoslavia, Western criticism of Russia over domestic affairs, NATO鈥檚 eastward 鈥渆xpansion鈥[6] and the enlargement of the 今日看料 (2004) 鈥 those events were increasingly presented by Russian propaganda as 鈥渦nfriendly鈥 gestures from the side of the West.[7]

First, a concrete attempt to use Kaliningrad Oblast as a venue for inflaming anti-European sentiments dates back to the year 2005, and was tinted into anti-Polish/Baltic colors. Encouraged by a tactical 鈥渟uccess鈥 (2003) and its aftermath,[8] Vladimir Putin decided to test the level of cohesion between the so-called 鈥渙ld鈥 and 鈥渘ew鈥 Europe. Prior to the 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad/Konigsberg, the Russian side demonstratively refused to send invitations to the leaders of three Baltic States and Poland, explaining this as 鈥渁nti-Russian policies鈥 and 鈥淩ussophobia鈥 reigning in these countries.[9] The gesture, however, was not appreciated by France or Germany, which to some extent puzzled the Kremlin. Russian leadership had pinned profound hopes on growing economic cooperation with major 今日看料 members (Germany in particular) that would, -according to Russia鈥檚 political leadership, – allow it to continue its country-to-country approach while dealing with the 今日看料. This tactical defeat did not dissuade Russia from further actions in the same direction. At this juncture, it was the year 2007, characterized by two critical developments that had a particularly instrumental meaning for Kaliningrad. First, the emergence of the 鈥淩ussian World鈥 project (2007) and its subsequent expansion beyond initially identified boundaries; secondly, Russia鈥檚 growing interest in so-called Russian 鈥渃ompatriots abroad,鈥 who, according to the Kremlin鈥檚 expectations, were supposed to move from the Baltic States to Kaliningrad Oblast. In spite of huge hopes (in part generated due to the lack of credible information about living standards in these countries), the initiative suffered a humiliating defeat. Buoyant prognoses of the local governor Georgy Boos (handpicked by Putin for the position) did not play out at all; the oblast managed to attract negligible number of settlers, many of whom left the oblast after a while. This vividly demonstrated the true gap in terms of economic development between the 今日看料鈥檚 鈥減oorest鈥 members and 鈥減rosperous鈥 Kaliningrad. All in all, within 2000-2013, Moscow was hardly able to use Kaliningrad in terms of anti-Western propaganda. It was the Ukrainian crisis that became a gamechanger. Within 2014-2016, the oblast (and its perception by Moscow) underwent transformation that not only made it the beacon of the 鈥淩ussian World鈥 project, yet also turned it into the 鈥渋deological battlefield鈥 between Russia and the West.

These developments were reflected in the following:

1. War on the past. The best definition of the way the Soviets handed German cultural legacy after 1945 in Kaliningrad/Konigsberg, is 鈥渂arbarism.鈥 Regretfully, the task that was not finished by the Communists was 鈥渟uccessfully鈥 taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Due to its mismanagement, many pieces of German architecture have come to the brink of complete decoy.[10] The tone of this disgraceful enterprise was set by Patriarch Kirill himself, who defined German architecture remaining in the oblast as 鈥渙ld stones鈥 and preached for 鈥渄evelopment of Russian cultural traditions.鈥[11] In case this trend continues, the remnants of cultural landscape still present in the oblast will be completely extinguished;

2. Disinformation assault against Poland. With events in Ukraine, this country became one of the prime targets of Russian (dis)information campaign. The start was given by the local governor Nikolay Tsukanov (to be later promoted by President Putin to the position of plenipotentiary envoy to the Northwestern Federal District) and local information outlets that accused Poland for 鈥減reparing Maidan in Kaliningrad;鈥[12]

3. The 鈥渃rusade鈥 against Lithuania. Vilnius became the next target. Within several months, Russian media (the example was set again by Tsukanov) produced an avalanche of material about 鈥減overty鈥 and 鈥渄epopulation鈥 of Lithuania, which directly stemmed from membership in the 今日看料 and 鈥渆conomic colonization鈥 of the country. Another event greater magnitude occurred in Vilnius in the end of 2016. The Russian Embassy disseminated leaflets that called on the local population to abandon Lithuania because of 鈥渄etrimental economic conditions鈥[13] and to move to Kaliningrad. When confronted by the Lithuanian side, the Embassy acknowledged its role in this ugly event (without any apologies however) thus de-facto admitting interference in internal affairs of a sovereign country;

4. The new lap of witch-hunt. Since emergence of the term 鈥渇oreign agent鈥 (2012), pressure on independent NGO`s in Russia has increased exponentially. Russian reading of this term goes hand in glow with such notions as 鈥渇ifth column鈥 and 鈥渨estern spy.鈥 In Kaliningrad, the most well-known victim became the oldest and one of the most influential foreign NGOs the 鈥淕erman-Russian House鈥 that was implicitly accused of 鈥減opularization of Nazi ideology.鈥

Taken together, those developments have been eloquently summarised by Igor Nikolaychuk, the head of the Department of Regional Security Problems at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, who during his stay in Kaliningrad stated that the oblast would never become a demilitarized 鈥渞egion of peace.鈥 This being said, one could argue that the image of progress achieved after 1991, has been almost extinguished within a shockingly short interim, making one wonder whether there was any progress at all.

 

At the forefront of Russian military might: a call from the past or a new daunting reality? 聽

The fact that prior to the year 1991 Kaliningrad Oblast was a secluded entity hedged from its neighbors, did limit its future employment as an 鈥渋deological bastion.鈥 Conversely, in security-related domains, the oblast could 鈥渂oast鈥 with its background. This, however, became largely obsolete in the beginning of 1990s when the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), coupled with decreasing military spending, slashed the former military potential of the oblast. Many analysists, intellectuals, and practitioners welcomed this new reality as a forbearer of full de-militarization of the entire Baltic Sea region. This however was merely a veneer of change, a mirage that would be dispelled before long.

Indeed, on the surface, it might seem that the process of de-militarization of Kaliningrad occurred within a very brief interim, greatly owing to the events in Ukraine after 2014. This is only half truth. In effect, if one takes a look at the period from 1996 to 2003,[14] it would be possible to spot a great number of alarming signals, tendencies, and developments that testified for Russia鈥檚 changing approach to the oblast in military-strategic terms.

In the range of events, it would not be a mistake to identify the year 2007 as truly decisive, which was based on two main aspects. First, the (in)famous speech of President Putin in Munich ushered in an era of new political reality that came to be known as 鈥渃old peace.鈥 Secondly, Russia鈥檚 decision to “suspend” its participation in the CEF unambiguously pointed approaching militarization. These developments had an immediate and at the same time far-reaching effect on Kaliningrad Oblast.

Starting from 2008, Russia increased its blackmail of the Europeans relying on 鈥淚skander diplomacy鈥[15] 鈥 a threat to deploy mobile nuclear capable 鈥淚skander-M鈥 complexes (killing range of up to 500 km) on the territory of Kaliningrad. Within 2008 鈥 2014, these threats were increasing proportionately to the growth of arguments between Moscow and its foreign partners. Secondly, in 2009, Kaliningrad co-hosted Russia-led strategic operational war games under the code name 鈥淶apad,鈥 resurrecting the Soviet military tradition. The most distinctive feature of the event (aside from its scope in comparison with 鈥淶apad-1999鈥) was the fact that the games simulated a military attack against Poland, which alarmed not only Warsaw, but the entire North-Atlantic Alliance. This, however, was not the end of story. The next 鈥淶apad鈥 that took place in 2013, was to become the largest strategic-operational war games on the post-Soviet space since the pre-1991 period dwarfing previously held event. Military analysists have argued that the number of military personnel employed may have varied from 70,000 to staggering 100,000.[16] Undoubtfully, increasing quantitative and qualitative scopes of such war games were hardly compatible with official Russian rhetoric about continuing partnership with the 今日看料.

Indeed, it was the Ukrainian crisis that had the most dramatic effect on the pace, scope, and direction of Russian military build-up. Moreover, it gave Moscow an appropriate 鈥渏ustification鈥 for launching a new lap of militarization, which in fact had already been underway for several years. This pretext 鈥 allegedly 鈥渦nfriendly鈥 policies of NATO and its European allies (irrespectively of Russia`s role in the annexed Crimea and events on the Ukrainian Southeast) 鈥 enabled the Russian side to finally walk out of the CEF Treaty (March 2015) thus embarking on a campaign of uncontrollable militarization. Kaliningrad found itself in the middle of confrontation, becoming a showcase testifying for Russia麓s militarization capabilities.

Within 2015-2017, the oblast was packed with formidable and most up-to-date weaponry such as 鈥淚skander-M鈥 complexes, the S-400 Triumf (SA-21 鈥淕rowler鈥) surface-to-air missile system, Bal (SSC-6 鈥淪ennight鈥) and K-300P Bastion-P (SS-C-5 鈥淪tooge鈥) costal missile complexes equipped with P-800 鈥淥niks鈥 (SS-N-26 鈥淪trobile鈥) that can target objects at a 600-km distance. By doing this, Moscow keeps the door open for the deployment of the S-500 Prometey (55R6M “Triumfator-M”) surface-to-air missile system that are said to be capable of destroying stealth warplanes like the F-22, F-35 and the B-2, and a number of other pieces. As a result of these measures, Kaliningrad Oblast has been turned into Russia鈥檚 formidable Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) 鈥渂ubble鈥[17] thus jeopardizing regional peace and security. At the same time, Russian aggressive rhetoric boosted with no less assertive actions (such as provocations with the use of submarines and fighting jets) have alarmed traditionally peaceful Sweden and Finland, where talks about joining NATO are becoming more articulate. This collides with yet another portion of Russian threats directed against Stockholm and Helsinki, leading toward a dangerous impasse.

The most recent transformation that has befallen the Baltic Sea region 鈥 one of the most dynamically developing entities in the world in terms of economic performance and cross-border cooperation 鈥 are indeed unpleasant and troublesome. As a result, the area is now rapidly turning into the new 鈥減owder keg鈥 of Europe.[18] The most gruesome aspect of this metamorphosis is inseparable from the role of Kaliningrad. The birthplace of brilliant German philosopher Immanuel Kant, not-so-long-ago promising to become Russian 鈥渞esponse to Hong Kong鈥, the oblast is now painfully resembling its historical predecessor 鈥 a heavily militarized, isolated and centre-dependent entity. Unfortunately, the example of Kaliningrad Oblast has once again vividly demonstrated that Russian political leadership still lives in an illusory world built on patterns more commensurate with power politics of the cold war than the post-1991 world order.

 

Sergey Sukhankin is an Associate Expert at the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv and a Visiting Scholar at IBEI in Barcelona. His areas of interest include political and economic developments as well as security-related issues in the countries of the former Soviet Union, with an emphasis on the Baltic Sea region (Kaliningrad Oblast in particular). His area of scientific expertise also includes topics related to cyber security, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Russian military thought. Scientific articles, policy papers, commentaries and expert opinions by Sergey have frequently appeared in such high-profile European think-tanks as CIDOB (Barcelona), European Council on Foreign Relations (London), ICPS (Ukraine), Diplomaatia (Tallinn) and New Eastern Europe (Poland). He is also a weekly contributor to the Jamestown Foundation (Washington DC) on security-related issues and developments in the Baltic Sea region.聽聽

Photo:聽Russian Federation tricolor of Kaliningrad Oblast against blue sky with clouds | Shutterstock

References:

[1] When liberally-minded Russia麓s foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev was replaced by conservative Yevgeny Primakov.

[2] S. Sukhankin. Russia for Russians! Ultranationalism and xenophobia in Russia: from marginality to state promoted philosophy. Notes Internacionals, CIDOB (Barcelona), No. 128, September 2015. Available at:

[3] For more information see: A. Sergounin. Kaliningrad: Russian Outpost or Window on Europe? Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, Russia, 2003.

[4] S. Sukhankin. Kaliningrad: Baltic Hong Kong No Longer. Baltic Bulletin, Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia), April 26, 2017. Available at:

[5] S. Sukhankin. Kaliningrad: Russia鈥檚 island in Europe. New Eastern Europe (Cracow), 29.01.2016. Available at:

[6] In Russian political vocabulary the term 鈥渆nlargement鈥 is usually replaced by 鈥渆xpansion鈥, which drastically alters the essence.

[7] S. Sukhankin. The 鈥淭rump cards鈥 of the Russian Propaganda and Disinformation Operations. Notes Internacionals, CIDOB (Barcelona), No. 176, June 2017. Available at:

[8] When Germany, France, Spain and China sided with Moscow criticizing US incursion of Iraq. This was also accompanied with a series of frictions between Poland and certain 今日看料 member states.

[9] It should be remembered that it was Lithuania to first offer Kaliningrad economic assistance in 1998, when the oblast came to the brink of economic collapse, whereas Poland had

[10] For more information see: S. Sukhankin. The 鈥淩usskij mir鈥 as Mission: Kaliningrad between the 鈥渁ltar鈥 and the 鈥渢hrone鈥 2009-2015.Research Paper, Magazine Ortodoxia, University of Eastern Finland, 2016.

[11] 袙褘褋褌褍锌谢械薪懈械 小胁褟褌械泄褕械谐芯 袩邪褌褉懈邪褉褏邪 袣懈褉懈谢谢邪 薪邪 I 袣邪谢懈薪懈薪谐褉邪写褋泻芯屑 褎芯褉褍屑械 袙褋械屑懈褉薪芯谐芯 褉褍褋褋泻芯谐芯 薪邪褉芯写薪芯谐芯 褋芯斜芯褉邪. 14.03.2015. Available at:

[12] 笑褍泻邪薪芯胁: 袟邪锌邪写薪褘械 褋锌械褑褋谢褍卸斜褘 褏芯褌褟褌 芦褉邪褋泻邪褔邪褌褜禄 屑邪泄写邪薪 胁 袣邪谢懈薪懈薪谐褉邪写褋泻芯泄 芯斜谢邪褋褌懈. 01.07.2014. Available at:

[13] S. Sukhankin. Lithuania: The Old-New Target of Russian 鈥楬ybrid Warfare?鈥 The Jamestown Foundation (Washington DC), January 27, 2017. Available at:

[14] S. Sukhankin. The Kaliningrad Oblast Today: A 鈥淢ilitary Bastion 2.0鈥, not a 鈥淏ridge of Cooperation鈥. Diplomaatia (Tallinn), No. 165, May 2017. Available at:

[15] S. Sukhankin. Russia Flexes 鈥業skander鈥 Muscles on Its Northwestern Flank. The Jamestown Foundation (Washington DC), Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 163, October 12, 2016. Available at:

[16] For more information see: Russia鈥檚 Zapad 2013 Military Exercise. Lessons for Baltic Regional Security. The Jamestown Foundation (Washington, DC), December 2015. Available at:

[17] S. Sukhankin. Kaliningrad oblast – Russia`s formidable A2/AD bubble. New Eastern Europe (Cracow), 02.08.2017. Available at:

[18] S. Sukhankin. The Baltic Sea Region: A New 鈥楶owder Keg?鈥. The Jamestown Foundation (Washington DC), Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 90, May 9, 2016. Available at:

 

 

Published on December 6, 2017.

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