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This is part of our special feature Governing the Migration Crisis.

 

Despite fears related to the increase in hate crime numbers following the ���տ��� referendum, and the uncertainty around their future residency status, immigrants from Poland will not abandon their established lives in the UK as willingly as the Brexit supporters would wish to see.

According to the latest release from the Office for National Statistics—which is the UK’s largest independent producer of official statistics—the most common non-UK country of birth in 2016 for UK residents was Poland.[i] It is estimated that around 911,000 UK residents are Polish-born, what accounts for 10 percent of the total foreign-born population of the country. Polish is also the most common non-British nationality in the UK with 1 million Polish nationals resident in the UK in 2016.[ii]

Many Britons think of Polish immigration as a recent phenomenon. In fact, the roots of the Polish community in the UK date back to the 1940s. More than 200,000 Poles who had contributed to the Second World War effort were offered British citizenship under the 1947 Polish Resettlement Act,[iii] which was the first mass immigration legislation of the UK’s Parliament. By the end of 1950, members of the Polish forces and their dependents accounted for a net immigration to the UK of about 115,000 people.[iv] During Nazi and Communist rule—from 1940 until 1990—the Poles set up a government-in-exile in London.

The community of 94,000 Poles lived in the UK even before 2004, the year when Poland joined the ���տ��� and Great Britain opened its labour market to all the new Central and East European Member States. It is estimated that from that moment, the number of Poles who found a new home in the UK had increased nearly nine times.

Inside the UK, the free movement of people, which is one of four fundamental freedoms of the ���տ���, stopped to be perceived as an agreement working for the mutual benefit of Britons and other Europeans, quickly becoming one of the bête noire of the British Eurosceptic movement.[v] On 23 June 2016 the UK citizens decided to leave the ���տ���. The referendum campaign’s rhetoric was described by some academics as “divisive” and “uncivil,”[vi] and the campaign as such as “criminally irresponsible” and “guilty of dishonesty.”[vii] The research shows that the news coverage during the campaign was skewed in favour of Brexit while creating a climate of fear and danger.[viii] The Brexiteers were accused of making promises to the British citizens that were not in a position to deliver, one of them being the reduction of numbers of ���տ��� immigration. Some researchers argue that the discourse of “taking back the UK” and “regaining control of immigration” was established in Britain’s collective memory in the years prior to the campaign.[ix]

 

Britain for Britons, England for Englishmen

Disappointment, shock, and uncertainty were among the most common feelings of the British Poles following the ���տ��� referendum.[x] “I was surprised by the result”—admits Łukasz Birecki[xi], a 35-year-old social worker from London. “I think that it was a very bad decision to leave the ���տ���, made by Britons on the basis of a biased and manipulated information. They did not understand what was going on during the campaign”—he adds. According to Paulina Panus, a 31-year-old HR specialist and yoga trainer from Kettering, Brexit was not a rational choice. “Only a minor percentage of leave voters shared some kind of economic justifications for their choice. The overwhelming majority of them voted for leaving the ���տ��� because of their aversion to foreigners—they wanted the Great Britain for Britons, and England for Englishmen. A lot of them, and especially uneducated people, thought that all of these foreigners—Poles, Lithuanians and all the others—would leave the UK immediately after the referendum”—she explains.

But some British Poles were not surprised, like Magda Widawska, a 30-year-old receptionist from London. “I could have predicted the result of the ���տ��� referendum by observing all that noise in the media”—says Magda. “There was also this strange mood that I could sense even in my workplace, which is a private club for artists, businessmen, and journalists in London. It is a bit strange but I could sense that we, the British Poles, were needed and unwanted at the same time. The club, as the whole British society, was divided on Brexit—our club members even had a regular fight on the day of the referendum!”

According to some of the British Poles, the growing negative attitude towards immigrants in the UK could have been observed much earlier than in the eve of the ���տ��� referendum. It was especially apparent in poorer communities, which were most affected by the post-2004 immigration from the new ���տ��� Member States. “There are still regions in the UK which have not recovered from the financial crisis yet”—says Marcin Wąs,[xii] a 37-year-old freelance photographer and filmmaker from London. “If you are poor and unhappy in your life, you are easy to manipulate. ���տ��� immigrants were scapegoats during the campaign. It was populist and very xenophobic and immigrants were used as a bugbear, but it was not merely about Poles.”

Yet, some Poles think that the campaign was indeed directed solely against them, as do some Britons. “Next morning after the referendum I got a lot of messages with apologies from my British friends and colleagues”—says Marcin. “They were abashed, sad and devastated. They had a kind of ‘referendum hangover,’ I guess.” Magda Widawska, in turn, describes her post-referendum morning at work: “I was witnessing two totally opposite situations—some people were apologizing to me, saying they were sorry and ashamed of the UK, while others were just extremely happy.”

Weeks after the referendum witnessed an unprecedented increase in hate crime incidents across the UK. Migrant communities, including the Polish one, were subjected to xenophobic and racist attacks. On June 26, 2016 the Polish Social and Cultural Association in west London found the words “f*** you” scrawled across the entrance. The very same day dozens of Britons and other UK residents flooded the Association with thousands of flowers and “I’m sorry” cards. Only in July 2016. the number of hate crimes in England increased by 41 percent compared to the same period in 2015.[xiii] On 27 August 2016, Arek Jóźwik, a Polish immigrant from Harlow, was attacked and beaten to death. “I could not recognise the country, which I had always praised for its tolerance and openness. All of the sudden there was ‘us’ and ‘them’”—says Paulina Panus. “I was scared”—confides Magda Widawska. And she continues: “I left my country in order to move to the other one, and this new country seemed to be safe. And suddenly there was this uncertainty and fear of being forced to move countries again. Should I move to Germany or Norway now and start everything over?”

 

Houses, mortgages, families, and friends

Many British Poles ask themselves the same question. Yet, for most of them, including Magda herself, the answer is “no.”

According to research done by Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics, ���տ��� immigrants are better educated, more likely to work, and less likely to claim benefits than the UK-born residents. They also consume goods and services, creating an increased demand, which, in turn, helps to create more employment opportunities. Moreover, ���տ��� immigrants pay more in taxes than they take out in welfare and public services.[xiv] As seen in school tests, Polish children work hard at school to catch up with UK-born kids[xv] while their parents work hard in offices, factories, and shops to support their families.

Many British Poles are also very serious about their new lives in the UK. They have invested a lot of effort in settling down and are not willing to easily abandon what they have built in the UK. “I do not think I could go back to Poland just like this and suddenly start a new life. It would be a big change, far too big”—says Paulina Panus. “People have houses, mortgages, families and friends here, and it is not that easy to leave it all. My home, my partner and my personal life are here and I will stay in the UK.” But as the debate on post-Brexit rights of ���տ��� immigrants have been unfolding, the level of uncertainty among British Poles regarding their future status in the UK has increased. “I do not believe that someone will tell me now that I cannot live in the UK because I do not have the British passport”—says Paulina. Magda Widawska adds: “I want to believe in such justice that people who arrived in the UK some time ago and have been working hard from the very beginning and paying their taxes will be allowed to stay.”

Now, even as the British Prime Minister Theresa May has finally triggered the article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and kick-started Brexit, little is known about the future of ���տ��� citizens in the UK. British non-governmental organizations, representing around 3.6 million ���տ��� citizens in the UK, have been campaigning to secure their rights (and the rights of UK citizens in the ���տ���) since the 2016 referendum.[xvi] But the UK government intends to use the issue as a bargaining chip during Brexit negotiations with the ���տ��� and avoids any conclusive statements. What is known is that ���տ��� citizens who have been residing in the UK for more than five years are given permanent residency rights. Since June 2016 many British Poles has applied for permanent residency and many will be entitled to do so by the planned end of Brexit negotiations in 2019. But the situation is not clear or easy for everyone. Paulina Panus: “At the time of the referendum I just returned to the UK after an eight-month travel break. I had been living in the UK for six years before that break and it suddenly turned out that I could not apply for residency status because the maximum period you can spend abroad in order not to lose the continuity of your stay is three months. Who am I now to the British system?” Surely more questions like this one will arise as the Brexit talks with the ���տ��� progress.

Despite article 50 kick-start, the emotions of the ���տ��� referendum seem to be down now and life is gradually getting back to normal for the majority of British Poles. “When it comes to daily life, I do not feel any difference between now and before the ���տ��� referendum”—says Ewa Wolakiewicz, a 36-year-old sociologist from London. “One exception is the press, which goes back and forth about Brexit and the issue of ���տ��� immigrants’ rights. There are a lot of anti-governmental campaigns as well and it reminds me that we are still living in a state of suspension.” In the weeks after the referendum the mainstream UK media were predicting a great outflow of Poles with such headlines as “Poles on Brexit: ‘I don’t think many will stay. Life in Britain is tough’”[xvii] or “The Poles looking to leave the UK after Brexit.”[xviii] Articles like the one published in November 2016 by The Independent on the uncertain future of British Poles and the unlikelihood of the massive outflow,[xix] were rare. Presently, as the outflow has not materialised, the British Poles try to live their lives as they lived before, adjusting when necessary. Some have experienced quite unexpected consequences of Brexit: “I am now a bit overwhelmed with questions about how I feel and what I think”—says a respondent who wants to be anonymous. “Around ten different universities from across the UK and even one from Australia have contacted me already regarding Brexit, and, to be honest, I am too tired with the topic to think about it”—she explains.

Is uncertain future and living in a state of suspension going to force the British Poles back to Poland? The Polish government announced in February 2017 that it expects from 100,000 to even 200,000 Polish returnees from the UK. Some Polish think tanks are even more “optimistic” and talk about 250,000 Poles expected to be back.[xx] It seems to be not much more but wishful thinking. According to a survey by IBRIS—a Polish market and social research foundation—undertaken in June and July 2016, just 5.5 percent of British Poles were considering a return migration to Poland (of which 57.7 percent were aged 65 and above) while 12.1 percent of them were thinking about moving to another ���տ��� state—just like Łukasz Biercki who, if forced to move, would go to Sweden. More than 40 percent of British Poles declared they would try to stay in the UK at any cost.[xxi] Moreover, according to a survey by Boston Consulting Group conducted among the participants of the Polish Economic Forum—a student conference, which took place at LSE in London on 5 March 2017—the interest in returning to Poland among Polish students of the best UK universities has dropped from 83 percent in 2016 to 75 percent in 2017.[xxii] Mateusz Morawiecki, Deputy Prime Minister of Poland and Minister of Development, argued: “You have to have optimistic assumptions in order for the reality to change”[xxiii]—but it seemed like he believed in magic spells to make people go back to their homeland.

If there is a flow from the UK to Poland in the coming years, it will not be massive. Students and those with fewer stable connections with the UK (e.g. singles) are most likely to voluntarily return to Poland. Unemployed and homeless people might just be forced to do so, while those with “global identity” might want to seek new opportunities in other ���տ��� states or even outside Europe.

 

It is not that easy that you decide to leave and that’s it!

It might be surprising but not every British Pole thinks that the decision to leave the ���տ��� was wrong.[xxiv] Others think that it was not a serious referendum in the first place: “Taking into account the fact that the next day after the referendum the top question on Google was “What is the ���տ���?”, I think that an average UK citizen does not know much about the Union”—says Marcin Wąs.[xxv]

But, regardless of their views on the referendum, all seem to ponder now how Brexit will affect them financially. “I think that we can expect great instability and it will considerably affect the UK economy”—says Paulina Panus. “Most probably the poorest will be the most affected”—she adds. Ewa Wolakiewicz underlines the fact that the ���տ���–UK relations are far more complicated than the average Brexiteer thought while voting: “It is not that easy that you decide to leave and that’s it! You have to know how to do it and how to function, also economically, without the ���տ���.” Over a longer term, the condition of UK’s economy after Brexit will certainly determine, for many British Poles, the rationale on whether to stay or move to other countries.

The British Poles seem to be less concerned with how Brexit will affect the ���տ��� itself but such voices as Paulina’s can also be heard: “I do not know much about politics but I think that the UK had a lot of power in the ���տ���. If you lose such a powerful player, there is chaos. It will take some time until the ���տ��� will find a new power equilibrium.” Indeed, 2017 seems to be one of defining moments in the ���տ���’s history.

With so many question marks and uncertainties around Brexit there is one thing that seems to be clear: most of the British Poles have built their new lives in the UK and they will do their best to stay, no matter how the UK immigration policy after Brexit will change. The British ship will sail off the ���տ��� shores, but a strong Polish crew will certainly remain on board.

 

Agnieszka Kulesa is a political scientist, PhD candidate at the Warsaw School of Economics, the Collegium of Socio-Economics. She is a member of the Migration Policy Program at the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA), a leading Polish think-tank and an independent center for policy research and analysis. At the Polish Institute of International Affairs and the Migration Policy Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Poland, she was responsible for international cooperation in the field of migration and coordinated various activities within the framework of the Prague Process. In 2014–2016 she worked for a British charity in London in a project dedicated to Polish migrants, and voluntarily supported asylum seekers, refugees and victims of trafficking in human beings.

 

References:

[i] See: Population of the UK by Country of Birth and Nationality: 2016, Office for National Statistics, 24 August 2017, .

[ii] J. Wadsworth, S. Dhingra, G. Ottaviano, J. Van Reenen, “Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK,” Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, .

[iii] For the full text of the Act see: .

[iv] J. Isaac, “British Post-War Migration,” Cambridge 1954, p. 176.

[v] J. Springford, “Is immigration a reason for Britain to leave the ���տ���?,” Centre for European Reform, October 2013, .

[vi] J. Martin, “Rhetoric of excess,” ���տ��� Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign, . The Foreign Affairs Committee analysis of Brexit was regarded by some academics as a reliable source of information: .

[vii] See for example: P. Yeung, “Brexit campaign was ‘criminally irresponsible’, says legal academic”, the Independent, 2 July 2016, .

[viii] Consult relevant articles in ���տ��� Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign, .

[ix] P. Rowinski, “Mind the gap: the language of prejudice and the press omissions that led a people to the precipice,” ���տ��� Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign, .

[x] K. Wawer-Dziedziak, “Brexit – pierwsze reakcje Polaków w Wielkiej Brytanii,” Biuletyn Migracyjny no 55, .

[xi] All persons quoted in this article were interviewed by the author of this text and agreed to share their names and stories, unless stated otherwise.

[xii] Name has been changed.

[xiii] Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015/2016, Home Office, .

[xiv] J. Wadsworth…, op.cit., p. 2., and J. Springford, S. Tilford, C. Odendahl, P. McCann, “The Economic Consequences of Leaving the ���տ���: the final report of the CER on Brexit 2016,” Centre for European Reform, 21 April 2016, .

[xv] C. Geay, S. McNally, S. Telhaj, “Non-Native Speakers in the Classroom: What are the Effects on Pupil Performance?,” Economic Journal, Volume 123, Issue 570, 2013.

[xvi] Check for example New Europeans’ #RightToStay campaign, .

[xvii] J. Borger, “Poles on Brexit: ‘I don’t many will stay. Life in Britain is tough’.” The Guardian, 22 July 2016, .

[xviii] E. Benke, “The Poles looking to leave the UK after Brexit,” BBC, 28 October 2016, .

[xix] J. Lowe, “After the Brexit vote, Britain’s Poles are facing uncertain future,” The Independent, 18 November 2016, .

[xx] T. Sąsiada, “Brexit. Nawet 200 tysięcy Polaków może wrócić do Polski,” 27 February 2017, .

[xxi] “Sondaż po Brexicie: ilu Polaków wróci do kraju?,” 24 July 2016, .

[xxii] “Co piąty Polak może wrócić z Wielkiej Brytanii: ‘Jesteśmy na zakręcie historii’,” TVN24 BiS, 5 March 2017, .

[xxiii] Ibidem.

[xxiv] K. Wawer-Dziedziak, op. cit.

[xxv] See for example: B. Fung, “The British are frantically Googling what the E.U. is, hours after voting the leave it,” The Washington Post, 24 June 2016, .